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CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT
Williams v. Superior Court,
Freedom Newspapers, Inc.,
Real Party in Interest,
5 Cal. 4th 337, 93 D.A.R. 7114,
No. S022639 (June 7, 1993).
Statutory Exemption From Public
Disclosure for Law Enforcement
Investigatory Files is
Strictly Construed
In this proceeding, the California Supreme Court interpreted the California
Public Records Act, Government Code
section 6250 et seq.; the particular provision at issue, Government Code section
6254(f), exempts law enforcement investigatory files from the Act's general requirement of public disclosure. The underlying dispute arose out of a newspaper's
request for access to a county sheriff's records of disciplinary proceedings against
two deputies. The disciplinary proceedings arose out of two separate investigations of the deputies' conduct-an administrative investigation and a criminal investigation. Among other things, the sheriff refused the request by asserting that
the requested criminal investigation records were expressly exempt from disclosure under section 6254(f). Eventually, the
matter reached the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, which, in attempting to set standards for determining whether particular
records would be exempt from disclosure,
articulated two limitations on the section
6254(f) exemption that do not appear on
the face of the statute. [12:2&3 CRLR
277]
The first such limitation resulted from
the appellate court's decision to incorporate into California law certain evaluative
criteria set out in the federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. section
552, which, like the Public Records Act,
permits the withholding of records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes. In contrast to the Public Records
Act, however, the FOIA permits withholding of these records only under six specified conditions. By incorporating the
FOIA criteria into the Public Records Act,
the appellate court in effect held that the
sheriff's law enforcement records are not
exempt from disclosure, despite the express exemption set out in section 6254(f),
unless the sheriff could satisfy one or more
of the FOIA criteria.
The second nonstatutory limitation
that the appellate court imposed on the
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section 6254(f) exemption affects records
which are not exempt from disclosure on
their face but become exempt because of
their inclusion in an investigatory file; the
appellate court appeared to have held that
such records remain exempt only so long
as they continue to relate to a "pending"
investigation.
On appeal, the California Supreme
Court clarified that the only two issues
properly before it were the sheriff's objection to the appellate court's holding that
the trial court must apply the FOIA criteria
in deciding whether the criminal investigation file must be produced under the
Public Records Act, and the sheriff's objection to the court of appeal's holding that
the exemption for investigatory files terminates when the investigation terminates. The court first addressed the appellate court's holding that section 6254(f) is
limited by the FOIA criteria, and concluded that the holding must be rejected as
inconsistent with the language, history,
and intent of the statute. The court explained that, without the FOIA criteria,
section 6254(f) "articulates a broad exemption from disclosure for law enforcement investigatory records." A portion of
the section which requires disclosure of
certain information derived from the records about incidents, arrests, and complaints does not, in most cases, entail disclosure of the records themselves. In contrast, section 6254(f), as the Fourth District interpreted it, would exempt investigatory records only to the extent that disclosure of the information would trigger
one of the six FOIA criteria.
According to the Supreme Court, the
most obvious and important objection to
the Fourth District's interpretation of section 6254(f) is that it finds no support in
the statutory language. In drafting section
6254(f), the legislature expressly imposed
several precise limitations on the confidentiality of law enforcement investigatory records. The court commented that
the legislature is capable of articulating
additional limitations if that is what it intends; further, the legislature has already
enacted statutory provisions to address
some of the concerns articulated in the
FOIA criteria. In view of the legislature's
painstaking efforts to articulate appropriate limitations on the mandatory disclosure of public records, the court found that
the argument in favor of incorporating the
FOIA criteria into the Public Records Act
is "extremely weak."
The court also stated that the legislature's
careful efforts to provide access to selected
information from law enforcement investigatory records would be largely a waste of
time if, as the court of appeal held, the
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records themselves are subject to disclosure when none of the FOIA criteria apply.
The Supreme Court cautioned that a court
should not lightly adopt an interpretation
of statutory language that renders the language useless in many of the cases it is
intended to govern. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that section
6254(f) should not be interpreted to incorporate the FOIA criteria.
The court then considered whether the
exemption for law enforcement investigatory files ends when the investigation
ends; while the parties agreed that otherwise nonexempt materials may become
exempt through their inclusion in an investigatory file, they disagreed about the
duration of that exemption. The newspaper argued that the exemption terminates
when the investigation terminates. On the
other hand, the sheriff asserted that the
statute on its face contains no time limitation and that the exemption serves interests that outlive the investigation for
which the file was originally created, such
as the safety of informants and undercover
officers, the integrity of related investigations, and the privacy of persons whose
affairs have been investigated but who
have not been charged with crimes.
In considering the scope of the exemption, the court reviewed the language of
the statute, noting that nothing therein purports to place a time limit on the exemption for investigatory files. According to
the court, if the legislature had wished to
limit the exemption to files related to
pending investigations, words to achieve
that result are available; the court noted
that it is not the province of courts "to
insert what has been omitted." Therefore,
the court held that, while there may be
reasons of policy that would support a
time limitation on the exemption for investigatory files, such a limitation is virtually impossible to reconcile with the language and history of section 6254(f). After
an exhaustive review of state and federal
caselaw on the matter, the court stated in
a footnote that "the matter does appear to
deserve legislative attention."

Roberts v. Palmdale, et al.,
5 Cal. 4th 363, 93 D.A.R. 8030,
No. S028100 (June 24, 1993).
Legal Opinion Directed to
Council Members Is Protected
by Attorney-Client Privilege
From Public Disclosure
In this case, the California Supreme
Court considered whether the California
Public Records Act, Government Code
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section 6250 et seq., requires public disclosure of a letter from the city attorney
distributed to members of the city council,
expressing the legal opinion of the city
attorney regarding a matter pending before the council; whether the transmission
of the written legal opinion at issue in this
case was a "meeting" within the terms of
the Ralph M. Brown Act, Government
Code section 54950 et seq.; and whether a
1987 amendment to the Brown Act intended to abrogate the attorney-client
privilege as it applies to the communication of written legal advice by a city attorney to a city council. By way of background, the court explained that after the
City of Palmdale's planning commission
approved a parcel map application, appellant Charmaine Roberts, a resident and
taxpayer of the city affected by the proposed development, appealed the matter
to the Palmdale City Council. The city
council took up the appeal at a public
meeting. Appellant's attorney wrote an
eight-page letter to the city council, arguing that the approval of the parcel map
was subject to legal challenge in several
respects and concluding that, unless it reversed the approval of the parcel map, the
city council was "a willing party to this
flagrant effort to undermine its own laws
and will be vulnerable to a court action to
overturn its decision."
The city council referred the letter to
the city attorney and continued the hearing
on the matter. The city attorney prepared
a confidential written response that was
distributed to the members of the city
council. A public meeting ensued, at
which the issues raised in the letter by
appellant's counsel were discussed. At the
hearing, appellant did not ask to see the
letter from the city attorney to the city
council, though the letter was referred to
at that hearing. The city council denied the
appeal and approved the map. Five days
later, appellant's counsel demanded a
copy of the city attorney's letter, arguing
that the denial of the appeal and approval
of the map were void if the city council
had acted on the basis of secret communications. The city council refused to provide appellant with a copy of the letter
from the city attorney. Appellant then petitioned for administrative mandamus,
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief
to void the action of the city council and
require the city council to make the disputed letter public. The superior court denied her petition, but the court of appeal
reversed. [ 12 :4 CRLR 241 J
The first question addressed by the Supreme Court is whether the city council
may assert the attorney-client privilege as
to the letter at issue in this case under the

Public Records Act, even though the letter
did not relate to pending litigation. The
court explained that the Public Records
Act provides that "every person has a right
to inspect any public record, except as
hereafter provided." The Act then exempts
certain records from disclosure; for example, section 6254(k) exempts "[r]ecords
the disclosure of which is exempted or
prohibited pursuant to federal or state law,
including, but not limited to, provisions of
the Evidence Code relating to privilege."
The court concluded that, by its reference
to the privileges contained in the Evidence
Code, the Public Records Act makes the
attorney-client privilege applicable to
public records. The court also explained
that Evidence Code section 950 et seq.
defines the attorney-client privilege, and
found that the letter at issue in this case
meets the definition of the term "confidential communication" as used in the Evidence Code. Further, the court stated that
"under the Evidence Code, the attorneyclient privilege applies to confidential
communications within the scope of the
attorney-client relationship even if the
communication does not relate to pending
litigation; the privilege applies not only to
communications made in anticipation of
litigation, but also to legal advice when no
litigation is threatened." The court also
rejected appellant's claim that Government Code section 6254(b) limits the attorney-client privilege in the context of
public records to matters that are actually
in litigation, finding that section 6254(b)
refers to litigation records generally, while
section 6254(k) specifically refers to matters of privilege, including the attorneyclient privilege.
Appellant next contended that under
Government Code section 54956.9 (part
of the Brown Act, which generally requires local government bodies to deliberate in public), any communication of any
nature with counsel may only occur between a local governing body and its attorney as provided by the section, and
since no litigation was pending or threatened in this case, and no notice of a closed
session was given, no closed session with
counsel could be permitted. According to
the court, the appellant assumed that the
transmission of a legal opinion is a
"closed-session meeting" or "closed session" of the city council within the terms
of section 54956.9. The court rejected this
argument, finding that the terms "meeting" and "session" "obviously imply collective action ... and not...the passive receipt by individuals of their mail."
Finally, the court addressed appellant's
claim that recent amendments to the
Brown Act require the abrogation of the
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attorney-client privilege except to the extent specifically provided in Government
Code section 54956. In dismissing this
claim, the court explained that "the language of section 54956.9 abrogates the
attorney-client privilege for the purpose of
the open meeting requirements of the
Brown Act, except as provided by the
section itself, but it does not purport to
regulate the transmission of documents
such as are at issue in this case. In fact, the
section acknowledges that written matter
sent from attorney to governmental client
is regulated by the Public Records Act and
not this section, by providing that the
attorney's written memorandum of reasons for requesting a closed session required by the section is 'exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 6254.1' of the
Public Records Act" (emphasis original).

CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
Funeral Security Plans, Inc. v.
Board of Funeral Directors and
Embalmers,
16 Cal. App. 4th 1672, 93 D.A.R.
8597, No. COl 1460 (July 1, 1993).

Pending Litigation Exception to
Open Meeting Act Protects
Funeral Board's Investigation
Before Initiation of Suit
In this proceeding, Funeral Security
Plans, Inc. (FSP) challenged the trial
court's rejection of its allegations that the
Board repeatedly violated the BagleyKeene Open Meeting Act, Government
Code section 11 I 20 et seq.; the Board
cross-appealed, seeking a reversal of the
trial court's denial of its request for court
costs and attorneys' fees. On March 25,
the Third District Court of Appeal issued
a opinion which affirms in part and reverses in part the trial court's decision.
Following the court's decision, the Board
filed a petition for rehearing; on April 26,
the court granted the Board's motion. On
July I, the Third District released a modified opinion which still affirms in part and
reverses in part the trial court's decision;
however, that opinion contained no substantial changes to the court's original decision summarized in the last issue of the
Reporter. { 13:2&3 CRLR 70-71, 225-26]
Among other things, the Third District
interpreted the scope of Government Code
section 11126(q), the "pending litigation"
exception to the public meeting requirement of the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting
Act, and concluded that the presentation
223
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of facts by legal counsel, deliberation, and
decisionmaking are necessary components of "conferring with" and "receiving
advice from" legal counsel for purposes of
the "pending litigation" exception to the
Act. The court also held that the Board did
not comply with the Act's requirement
that "legal counsel of the state body shall
prepare and submit to it a memorandum
stating the specific reasons and legal authority for the closed session" whenever
the Board meets in private under the
"pending litigation" exception. Third, the
court interpreted Government Code section 11126( d) to permit the Board to deliberate on an adjudicative matter in closed
session only if evidence introduced in a
public Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
proceeding is being considered by the
Board in rendering its decision. However,
section l l l 26(d) does not allow the Board
to go into closed session to receive new
evidence and/or deliberate on petitions for
termination of probation, reinstatement of
a license, or reduction of a penalty not
based on evidence introduced at a public
administrative proceeding. Finally, the
court held that the Board's two-member
advisory committees are state bodies
which must meet in public, pursuant to
Government Code section 1112 I. 7.
On behalf of the Board, the Attorney
General's Office (AG) filed a petition for
review with the California Supreme Court
in early August. Among other things, the
AG's petition disputes the Third District's
finding that the Board's two-member advisory committees are state bodies which
must meet in public under the BagleyKeene Act and the court's interpretations
of both Government Code section
11126(d) and the scope of the "pending
litigation" exception to the Act. At this
writing, the Supreme Court has not issued
a ruling on the Board's petition for review.

Buhl, et al., v. Hannigan, et al.,
16 Cal. App. 4th 1612, 93 D.A.R.
8501, No. G012245 (June 30,
1993).

Mandatory Motorcycle Helmet
Law's Relationship to Public
Safety Concerns Satisfies
Constitutional Standards
In this proceeding, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of California's Mandatory Motorcycle
Helmet Law, Vehicle Code section 27802
et seq., which requires motorcyclists and
their passengers, when riding on the highways, to wear helmets complying with
section 27802, and makes it unlawful for
224
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them to fail to do so. Among other things,
the court held that the law is rationally
related to a legitimate state concern; it is
not impermissibly vague; it does not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act
(42 U.S.C. sections 12132-12213) or the
Unruh Civil Rights Act (California Civil
Code section 51 et seq.); and it does not
impennissibly infringe on freedom of religion, freedom of expression, or the right
of privacy.

Dibb v. County of San Diego,
et al.,
18 Cal. App. 4th 1520, 93 D.A.R.
12221, No. D016569 (Sept. 24,
1993).

Board of Supervisors Can Create
A Citizens' Review Panel With the
Power to Subpoena Witnesses
In 1990, the San Diego County Board of
Supervisors proposed an amendment to the
County Charter, adding section 606 requiring the Board to create the Citizens Law
Enforcement Review Board (CLERB);
county voters approved the amendment in
November 1990. Accordingly, the Board
adopted section 606 which providesamong other things-that CLERB 's duties
include the review and investigation of citizen complaints and any deaths of individuals
arising out of or in connection with actions
of peace officers, and that CLERB shall have
the power to subpoena and require attendance of witnesses and the production of
books and papers pertinent to its investigations and to administer oaths. Pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, plaintiff brought this action as a county taxpayer
seeking to enjoin the County from spending
funds in order to implement CLERB, arguing that the County may not constitutionally grant CLERB the subpoena power.
In considering whether a charter county
may amend its charter to provide for the
creation of a citizens' panel to review citizen
complaints about the county sheriff's and
probation departments and, more specifically, grant to that panel the power to subpoena witnesses and evidence, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal initially noted that
Government Code section 25303 requires a
county board of supervisors to "supervise
the official conduct of all county officers ... and particularly insofar as the functions and duties of such county officers ... relate to the assessing, collecting, safekeeping,
management, or disbursement of public
funds." Further, Government Code section
31000.1 provides that the "board of supervisors may appoint commissions or committees of citizens to study problems of general

or special interest to the board and to make
reports and recommendations to the
board"; according to the court, "[c]learly
CLERB is a citizens' commission which
falls within this broad definition."
After finding that the board created an
authorized entity to study issues within the
legitimate scope of the Board's responsibilities, the court then considered whether
the County charter may grant to this entity
the power to subpoena witnesses and documents to assist in its investigations. The
Fourth District noted that article 11, section 4, of the California Constitution authorizes charter counties to legislate on a
variety of local topics and specifies that
the county charter shall provide for the
powers and duties of all county officers.
Because CLERB members perform a public function, are appointed to a fixed "term
of office," and serve without compensation, the court found that they qualify as
"county officers" within the meaning of
section 4; accordingly, the County is authorized to specify in the charter or by
ordinance their powers.
The court explained that the intent behind section 4 is to extend to counties the
option of "home rule"-the right of selfgovernment over local and county affairs.
According to the court, "[u]tilization of
the subpoena power is not in any sense
inconsistent with the function of local
government"; moreover, "as a practical
matter, eliminating the subpoena power
would frustrate CLERB's salutary purposes ... because it is likely many peace
officers and other critical witnesses would
not appear voluntarily." The court therefore concluded that the provisions of the
California Constitution which authorize
"home rule" by charter counties permit
such a county, in delineating the powers
of county officers and employees, to confer on a citizens; review board the authority to subpoena witnesses and documents
in furtherance of its investigations.

CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR
COURTS
Planning and Conservation
League v. Lungren,
No. C-93 373836 (July 2, 1993).

Court Invalidates Election Law
Prohibiting Ballot Initiative
Sponsors From Including Projects
in the Initiative That Benefit Them
Sacramento County Superior Court
Judge James Ford has ruled that Elections
Code section 5358, which provides that no
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person shall include an appropriation for
a particular project within the text of an
initiative petition in exchange for a campaign contribution or a pledge for a campaign contribution for purposes of qualifying the petition for the ballot, violates
the First Amendment and is therefore invalid. The Planning and Conservation
League (PCL) brought this action in
March after Attorney General Dan
Lungren refused to process a PCL-backed
initiative called the California Safe Drinking Water and Fish and Wildlife Protection
Act of 1994; according to Lungren, he
refused to approve the initiative because
the backers failed to sign a required affidavit indicating compliance with section
5358. PCL contended that section 5358
infringes on their rights to freedom of
speech and association.
Ford agreed with PCL, stating that section 5358 "seems to be a severe infringement on the initiative process itself and
has a chilling effect on the initiative process and would prevent people from going
forward and presenting legislation that
they thought was perfectly suitable, good
for the public weal, and beneficial to the
people of the State of California as a
whole." Ford further noted that "[i]t seems
almost that the objection here really is a
form of new political correctness in a way
that no one must have a base motive to
promote legislation in the initiative process, that one must have a pure and sweet
heart before one can be a proponent of
legislation."
The Attorney General is expected to
appeal the decision; at this writing, however, no notice of appeal has been filed.
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